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In recent years, there have been several books written about disposi-
tions. Barbara Vetter’s Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality is 
another, but it is not just another. Vetter’s book stands out as an am-
bitious, original, and systematic attempt to develop a new account of 
metaphysical modality in terms of dispositional properties she calls 
‘potentialities.’ According to Vetter, saying that something has a dis-
position, like fragility or flammability, is to say something about what 
it can do, such as break or burn. Dispositional concepts are members 
of a broader class of modal concepts, which also includes necessity, 
possibility, causation, laws, and essence. Vetter’s basic idea is that po-
tentialities are fundamental, and other modal notions should be un-
derstood in terms of them. While she is not the first to suggest that 
modality can be grounded in dispositional properties, Vetter moves 
beyond the mere suggestion to present a detailed potentiality-based 
account of modality and provides arguments that it is extensionally 
correct, formally adequate, and semantically useful. Vetter spends 
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relatively little time engaging with adversaries or critiquing alterna-
tives, but instead focuses on clearly and methodically articulating her 
positive view. 
The first chapter introduces the reader to the project and provides 
some background. Vetter motivates her project by explaining her dis-
satisfaction with leading accounts of modality. Major rivals appeal to 
‘‘possible worlds,’’ but disagree as to whether these worlds are other 
concrete universes, sets of propositions, uninstantiated properties, or 
some other type of abstract objects. While Vetter grants that the pos-
sible-worlds semantics for modality is useful and heuristically valu-
able, she claims that possible worlds are not apt for providing a plau-
sible account of what is going on in reality that makes it the case that 
something is possible or necessary. Furthermore, Vetter raises doubts 
about a major motivating assumption of possible-worlds approaches—
the idea that modality reduces to something that is non-modal. If there 
are some irreducible modalities, such as potentialities, then perhaps 
we can account for other modalities without looking to other possi-
ble worlds. 
Chapters 2 and 3 begin developing the account of potentiality by 
clarifying the more familiar concept of a disposition. Vetter argues 
against the ‘‘standard conception’’ of dispositions which associates 
them with conditional statements. On a standard conception, ‘x is 
fragile’ is defined as something like ‘if x were struck, x would break.’ 
But even fragile things don’t break when struck very softly, and some 
non-fragile things break when they are struck very hard. A challenge 
for such an analysis is to formulate the antecedent of the conditional 
so that it specifies circumstances in which all and only fragile things 
break. Vetter explores a number of strategies for doing this and ar-
gues that they all fail, due to the qualitative and quantitative diver-
sity of the stimulus conditions of virtually all dispositions. Having dis-
patched the standard conception, Vetter goes on to offer an alternative 
account of dispositions according to which they are most closely as-
sociated not with conditionals, but with possibility. On her account ‘x 
is fragile’ means roughly ‘x can break (easily)’ with no stimulus spec-
ified. Vetter justifies this move with careful consideration of ordinary 
disposition concepts. Vetter also notes that ordinary disposition as-
criptions are highly context-sensitive. Whether something counts as 
fragile can vary by context, but whether or not an object instantiates 
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a mind-independent property is not relative to such factors. So, Vet-
ter posits a metaphysical background in virtue of which a disposition 
ascription can be true in a context. That background is constituted by 
potentialities—a term adopted by Vetter to refer to disposition-like 
properties that constitute a broader class of properties individuated 
by their manifestations. 
These considerations motivate the move from dispositions to po-
tentiality, further developed in Chapter 4. Potentialities differ from 
dispositions in a number of ways. The truth of potentiality ascrip-
tions is not context-dependent. Furthermore, while ordinary dispo-
sition ascriptions typically suggest that the occurrence of the mani-
festation is highly likely, the likelihood of a potentiality manifesting 
ranges from barely possible to necessary. Potentialities come in a wide 
spectrum of degrees (21). Vetter further expands the notion of poten-
tiality to include: joint potentialities (potentialities that two or more 
things jointly possess); extrinsic potentialities (potentialities that a 
thing possesses at least partially in virtue of other distinct objects); 
and iterated potentialities (potentialities for further potentialities). 
This substantial expansion of the potentiality concept results in its 
extension including Cambridge properties, such as the potentiality 
of the Eiffel tower to be such that my nose is tanned (116). Vetter as-
sures us that such bizarre-sounding properties are not problematic, 
since they are ultimately grounded in the natural, intrinsic proper-
ties of particular objects. 
Once Vetter has explained the notion of potentiality, she proceeds 
to her main objective, to give an account of metaphysical modality in 
terms of it. In Chapter 5, she develops a formal language and intro-
duces a logic for potentiality. By Chapter 6, she is in position to de-
fine ‘possibility’ in terms of potentiality: ‘It is possible that P’ is de-
fined as: ‘Something has an iterated potentiality for it to be the case 
that P’ (197). Vetter provides a demonstration that the account is for-
mally adequate, then spends the balance of Chapter 6 showing how the 
account can be used to interpret various modal statements. In Chap-
ter 7, she defends her claim that the account yields intuitively correct 
truth-values for modal statements. In doing so, she address questions 
such as: Do any potentialities have impossible manifestations? What 
potentialities ground the possibility that some things that do not ex-
ist could have existed? Can the potentialities of actual concrete objects 
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ground the possibility that the laws of nature could have been other-
wise? Are there any potentialities regarding things in the past? Vetter 
does not claim to have conclusively answered all of these questions, 
but she does claim to have presented a serious candidate for a theory 
of the metaphysics of modality, which makes such questions matters 
for further consideration and debate (214). 
Obviously, questions about this potentiality account of modality 
remain. Here I will press two more. Vetter claims that potentialities 
can ground possibilities and make sense of our comparative and con-
text-sensitive disposition ascriptions, because they come in degrees. 
But what does it mean for a property to come in degrees? The view 
of properties that Vetter assumes in this book is best described as im-
manent realism: properties are the kind of entities that different par-
ticulars can share (29) and a property does not exist unless some ob-
ject (at least potentially) has it (272). According to immanent realism, 
properties do not exist in some other realm, but are wholly present in 
particulars that instantiate them. But if a universal is wholly present 
wherever it is instantiated, it cannot possibly differ across instantia-
tions. Immanent realism has trouble accounting for imperfect resem-
blance, since, if two things are similar because they literally share one 
thing, they must be perfectly similar in that respect. So if something 
is highly breakable and something else is less breakable, it is hard to 
see how that is explained in terms of their literally sharing one and 
the same ‘breakability.’ 
To account for the idea that potentialities come in degrees, Vet-
ter suggests that a potentiality is a determinable, all of the specific 
degrees to which it can be possessed are its determinates (95). So, 
consider a fragile glass and a barely breakable crowbar. They have 
different determinates of the determinable ‘breakability.’ Is the de-
terminable ‘breakability’ wholly present in each of them? If it were, 
it would have to be the same in each instance, but it’s not. So, where 
is the determinable ‘breakability’ located? Perhaps, instead of being 
present in its instances, it is a higher-order universal had by the de-
terminate ‘breakabilities.’ This suggestion amounts to positing a hi-
erarchy of universals, the higher-level ones being universals had by 
lower-level universals. Higher-order determinable universals are not 
instantiated by particulars directly by being present in them, but in-
directly, in virtue of their lower-order determinate universals being 
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instantiated. Since this hierarchical account posits universals that are 
not present in any particulars, it is friendlier to transcendent realism, 
according to which universals can exist without being present in ob-
jects. But such a Platonic view is in tension with Vetter’s motivation to 
ultimately ground modality in the ways that actual, concrete objects 
are (270). So, perhaps a different account of properties would better 
suit her purposes. Vetter seems open to trope-nominalism—the idea 
that sharable ‘‘properties’’ are classes of resembling particular prop-
erty instances (29). But trope-nominalism notoriously has no account 
of resemblance, let alone imperfect resemblance. So, it is not obvious 
what it would mean for a class of tropes to come in degrees. If Vet-
ter’s account is to be an adequate metaphysical account of modality, 
questions about the metaphysics of potentialities need answers: Are 
they universals? Are they tropes? How are we to interpret the claim 
that they ‘‘come in degrees’’? 
My second questions is: Do potentialities adequately explain neces-
sity? On Vetter’s account, ‘Necessarily P’ is true if and only if ‘Nothing 
has, had, or will have a potentiality that not P’ (203). Now, consider 
the claim ‘triangles have three sides.’ True, nothing had or has the po-
tentiality to make it the case that triangles do not have three sides. 
But why not? And are we sure that nothing ever will have the poten-
tiality to be such that a triangle has four sides? Must we rely on in-
duction here? Consider the claim ‘Nothing has, had, or will have a po-
tentiality to be such that a gold sphere is a mile in diameter.’ If that is 
true, it follows by Vetter’s definitions that necessarily, all gold spheres 
are smaller than a mile in diameter. But a mile-diameter gold sphere 
seems metaphysically possible. So Vetter must insist that something 
does or will have the potential to be such that a mile-diameter gold 
sphere exists, even though none have existed yet. But why should we 
have a different assessment of the prospects for a mile-diameter gold 
sphere than we do for a four-sided triangle? 
The text gives some indication of how Vetter might answer. With 
respect to the necessity of identity, she appeals to an axiom in her 
logic of potentiality: ‘‘NON-CONTRADICTION, Nothing has a potenti-
ality to be such that a contradiction holds’’ (180). That seems hard to 
deny, assuming contradictions are impossible. But it is not clear that 
this gets the order of explanation right. Are contradictions impossible 
because nothing has the potential to be such that they hold? Or does 
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nothing have the potentiality to be such that a contradiction holds be-
cause they are impossible? If it is the latter, even if necessity state-
ments can be translated into potentiality statements in the way Vetter 
suggests, potentiality does not serve as the metaphysical ground or ex-
planation of metaphysical necessity. If this is right, it need not be fa-
tal to Vetter’s project, but it would warrant scaling back its ambitions. 
One possible revision would be to maintain that the bi-conditionals in 
the potentiality account of modality are true, but to withdraw claims 
about the direction of grounding and explanation. A different revi-
sion would be to use potentiality just to account for physical possibil-
ity and related notions. This would not be as ambitious as accounting 
for all of modality, but if successful, it would be quite an accomplish-
ment none the less. 
